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Abstract
People experiencing mental distress and illness are frequently on the receiving end of stigma, epistemic injustice, and social 
isolation. A range of strategies are required to alleviate the subsequent marginalisation. We ran a series ‘philosophy of mind’ 
workshops, in partnership with a third-sector mental health organisation with the aim of using philosophical techniques to 
challenge mental health stigma and build resources for self-understanding and advocacy. Participants were those with lived 
experience of mental distress, or unusual beliefs and experiences; mental health advocates; and mental health service provid-
ers (such as counsellors, psychologists and psychiatrists). We draw on a shared perspective as a participant and facilitator of 
the workshop series to assess their impact. We discuss the following benefits: (i) the opportunity for structured discussion 
of experiences and models; (ii) dialogue across different mental health backgrounds; (iii) the potential to reduce self-stigma 
and to increase self-understanding and advocacy; and (iv) the potential to alleviate (some) epistemic injustice. We invite 
researchers and mental health practitioners to consider further opportunities to investigate the potential benefits of philosophy 
groups in mental health settings to establish whether they generalise.
Keywords Mental health · Philosophy groups · Epistemic injustice · Stigma · Mental health advocacy
Background
In this paper, we report on a series of ‘philosophy of mind’ 
workshops, which were run in partnership with a third-sector 
mental health organisation during the winter of 2017–2018. 
We are the workshop series designer and facilitator (an aca-
demic philosopher working on an interdisciplinary research 
project on mental health at the time of the workshop series), 
and a workshop participant and presenter. Our perspective 
is informed by the lived experience of mental distress, and 
knowledge of philosophical approaches to mental health.1 
This paper constitutes our shared reflections on the work-
shop series, and where we speak from our distinct perspec-
tives and experiences, we sign-post this accordingly (e.g. 
“from the participant/facilitator perspective…”).
A number of background conditions motivate the pro-
ject, including mental health stigma, epistemic injustice and 
social isolation. We briefly describe each in turn:
Mental health stigma
People experiencing mental distress and illness are fre-
quently on the receiving end of stigma, in which they are 
unjustifiably assumed to have, or otherwise associated with, 
negative characteristics. For instance, people are shown to 
associate mental illness with incompetence and being dan-
gerous (Corrigan and Watson 2002; Phelan et al. 2000). 
The stigma around mental health is pervasive (e.g. Brener 
et al. 2013; Peris et al. 2008; and see Puddifoot 2019 for an 
overview). People who experience mental distress have been 
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1 There are different frameworks for understanding the experi-
ences and cognitions that often lead to diagnoses of mental illness. 
For instance, there are frameworks which defer to medical explana-
tions, according to which these experiences are the result of biologi-
cal processes, and are amenable to medical interventions (Mechanic 
1999; Wardrope 2015). Then there are frameworks which defer to 
social explanations, and which locate understanding of these experi-
ences in past trauma, relationships, and material circumstances (Mul-
vany 2001; Beresford et al. 2010). Then there are hybrid frameworks 
which emphasise a combination of factors (Pilgrim 2002; Johnstone 
and Boyle 2018). In this article we do not presuppose a particular 
framework, and refer instead to “the experience of mental distress”, 
or “cognitions which attract a psychiatric diagnosis”. Sometimes 
when we describe a particular study, we adopt the language of that 
study’s authors for the purpose of communicating their findings, but 
in doing so we do not thereby adopt their preferred framework. This 
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shown to stigmatise themselves (Corrigan et al. 2014; Sickel 
et al. 2019; Knaak et al. 2017; Bracke et al. 2019). These 
stereotypical associations tend to be reinforced by the media. 
For example, primetime television presents overwhelmingly 
negative portrayals of mental illness, with the characters 
who experience it being the most likely to commit violence 
(Signorielli 1989). Negative portrayals of mental illness 
across the media persist, and have been shown to contribute 
the public’s negative attitudes towards those who experience 
mental distress (Sieff 2003; Ma 2017). The stigma encoun-
tered in everyday life has been described as worse than the 
mental illness and distress itself (Thornicroft 2017).
Epistemic injustice
Related to stigma, is the notion of epistemic injustice, a dis-
tinctive kind of injustice which harms someone by limiting 
their capacity to share or attain knowledge, on the basis of 
their perceived membership of a marginalised social group. 
Fricker articulates two chief kinds of epistemic injustice 
(Fricker 2007). There is testimonial injustice, in which the 
testimony of people from marginalised groups is not appro-
priately believed. There is also hermeneutic injustice, in 
which marginalised groups have fewer resources for under-
standing aspects of their social experiences in comparison 
to groups with greater social and cultural power. Multiple 
authors have investigated how people in mental distress 
are at risk of epistemic injustice in both medical and social 
encounters (Carel and Kidd 2014; Sanati and Kyratsous 
2015; Wardrope 2015; Crichton et al. 2017; Kurs and Grin-
shpoon 2018; Miller Tate 2018). Richard Lakeman (2010), 
a mental health professional, gives an account of personal 
experience of epistemic injustice, in which he noticed a 
marked difference in how his testimony was received by col-
leagues during a period of mental distress as compared to 
before that period. In particular, he reports that his testimony 
regarding reactions he was having to a prescribed psycho-
tropic drug was not taken as seriously by his colleagues as 
they had taken his testimony prior to this period of mental 
distress.
Social isolation
Zavaleta et al. describe social isolation as an “inadequate 
quality and quantity of social relations with other peo-
ple at the individual, group, community, and larger social 
environment levels where human interaction takes place,” 
(Zavaleta et al. 2014; in Wang et al. 2017). Those experienc-
ing mental distress and illness also frequently experience 
social isolation (White et al. 2000; Cacioppo et al. 2006; 
Richman and Sokolove 1992). From the perspective of lived 
experience, we suggest that social isolation is importantly 
connected to the above two features. Experiencing system-
atic social injustice in daily life compounds the sense of 
social isolation felt in mental distress, and can become part 
of mental distress itself. Meanwhile, taking action to tackle 
stigma takes up a lot of emotional energy, particularly when 
it is done as an individual as opposed to when part of a col-
lective, and can result in exhaustion, which itself compounds 
social isolation.
Numerous authors have considered a variety of means of 
alleviating the negative consequences of stigma, epistemic 
injustice, and social isolation in mental health contexts (e.g. 
Thornicroft et al. 2016; Crichton et al. 2017; Evans-Lacko 
et al. 2014). It is likely that a combination of strategies are 
required to make a positive impact. In this paper, we explore 
whether doing philosophy together might present one such 
means of making a modest but positive impact.
Philosophy groups and mental health
The project took place between October 2017 and January 
2018, in partnership with Mind in Camden, a mental health 
charity based in London, UK. Participants were enrolled in 
the free, six-session workshop series, after responding to an 
email announcement on the Mind in Camden mailing list, 
resulting in two groups each comprising ten participants. 
Participants drew on a variety of backgrounds in mental 
health. The groups included people with lived experience 
of mental distress, or cognitions which attract a psychiat-
ric diagnosis; mental health advocates; and mental health 
service providers (such as counsellors, psychologists and 
psychiatrists). Many people belonged to more than one of 
these categories.
The recognition that pronouncements in mental health 
contexts should be open to philosophical scrutiny was a key 
motivator for our philosophy groups. A chief aim was to 
critically explore the association between irrationality and 
mental illness. As Elly Vintiadis observes, attention to the 
manuals which set the diagnostic criteria for mental disor-
ders reveals that “rationality plays a big role in what counts 
as a mental disorder and, hence, in who we judge to have 
one and how we treat them” (Vintiadis 2016). We explored 
empirical evidence of irrational cognitions in the non-clin-
ical population which are not routinely pathologised. We 
then used philosophical enquiry to investigate the similari-
ties and differences between these and cognitions in men-
tal distress (which are routinely pathologised), in order to 
Footnote 1 (continued)
article describes a workshop series in which we encouraged partici-
pants to explore the available frameworks, and adopt (or to develop) 
the framework that they felt best captured their experiences, and we 
welcome the reader to do this as well.
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critically investigate the role of rationality in the ascription 
of pathology.
Sessions were 90 min long.2 The six sessions were struc-
tured around the following topics: (1) Introduction and 
philosophical techniques; (2) Experiences; (3) Beliefs; (4) 
Rationality; (5) Models of mental health; (6) Evaluation 
(recapping learning from previous five sessions, critical 
analysis of value judgements made about different experi-
ences and beliefs). In developing these workshops, we also 
created open-access resources for facilitating them, which 
can be accessed online.3 There, a detailed description of all 
sessions and content is available, as well as a facilitator pack, 
but to give some idea, we describe a few of the sessions in 
brief here.
The first session introduced the notion of philosophical 
argument: for instance, articulating a claim and supporting 
it with evidence, distinguishing normative from descriptive 
claims; and recognising and scrutinising underlying assump-
tions. Participants also split into groups to discuss different 
examples of thought experiments provided by the facilita-
tor (e.g. the glass bridge from Gendler (2008) and the city 
dweller from Tufayl (1972), and learned about how to use 
them to tease out intuitions and to support arguments by 
coming up with their own thought experiments. We focused 
on philosophy as a dialectical practice that involves at least 
two parties exchanging ideas. Each party can aim to con-
vince the other of their view, or, as we preferred to present 
the practice: each person uses this opportunity to articulate 
their view by trying make their point as clearly as possible, 
and in doing so, perhaps understands their own thought pro-
cess on the matter at hand a little better. Participants’ posi-
tions evolve as the clarity of their thinking increases, with 
some who start out on one side of the debate ending up on 
the other at the end of the practice.
The second session opened with a general discussion, 
in which participants considered the nature of experience, 
and what (if anything) is special about experiences termed 
“hallucinations”. Guided by the facilitator, participants 
discussed two models: passive processing, in which the 
content of experience is accounted for by input from the 
external world, and predictive processing, in which a vari-
ety of internal processes also shape experiential content. 
The facilitator then presented a series of optical illusions 
shown via a slide deck (but which could also be shown with 
hand-outs), in order to demonstrate how internal processes 
sometimes shape experiential content, even for experiences 
not typically considered to be pathological. For instance, to 
provoke thought and discussion on the latter, the facilita-
tor shared a series of images which appeared initially to be 
nebulous and unorganised shapes, but which could be per-
ceived as an object, only after one is presented with an idea 
of what to look for. Guided by the facilitator, participants 
discussed Andy Clark’s notion of perception as “controlled 
hallucination” (2013). Participants then discussed whether 
systematic distinctions can be made between, for instance, 
hallucinations and voice hearing that sometimes accompany 
a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and experiences of optical and 
auditory illusions in people without this diagnosis, and what 
these distinctions might consist in.
The following sessions proceeded with a similar struc-
ture: (i) an open discussion regarding the phenomena to be 
investigated that week (e.g. belief and delusion; rational-
ity); (ii) an overview of competing philosophical models 
of the phenomena, guided by the facilitator; (iii) discussion 
of examples (provided by the facilitator); and (iv) critical 
analysis of the models in light of the examples discussed. 
The sessions involved conceptual analysis, with participants 
considering, for instance, whether the concept of a hallu-
cination is accurately captured in the definitions given by 
various researchers (for example, Cachia et al. say “visual 
hallucinations [are] defined as erroneous visual perceptions 
not elicited by an external stimulus” (2015: 1101)). Partici-
pants also considered whether psychiatric concepts, such 
as that of a delusion, are accurately described in various 
iterations of diagnostic manuals [e.g. the Diagnostic and 
statistical manual of mental disorders (American Psychiatric 
Association (2013)]. The sessions also involved discussion 
of empirical findings. For instance, in the third session, we 
compared findings regarding what have been termed “gran-
diose delusions” about having inflated self-worth (Knowles 
et al. 2011); with empirical findings regarding inflated self-
worth in the non-clinical population, such as Cross’s find-
ing that 94% of the college professors believe that they do 
above-average work (1977). Some sessions also involved 
discussions of individual cases, such as of individuals with 
schizophrenia and dementia, for the purpose of contextualis-
ing the associated unusual or ungrounded cognitions in the 
context of the person’s life experiences and relationships.4 
This facilitated discussion of how these cognitions can be 
both harmful and helpful (in so far as they can help to make 
sense of that person’s world in times of difficulty, and can 
enhance agency, motivation and sociability).
2 The original proposal was for 60 min sessions, with the following 
half-hour reserved in case participants wanted to continue discussion, 
but early on, both groups discussed and decided that they would like 
the sessions to run for the full 90 min.
3 Open access resources for the Philosophy of Mind Workshop Series 
can be found here:  https ://www.birmi ngham .ac.uk/gener ic/perfe ct/
resou rces/philo sophy -of-mind.aspx
4 Examples were drawn from cases studied in the course of the first 
author’s research project, on  the Pragmatic and Epistemic Role of 
Factually Erroneous Cognitions and Thoughts (Project  PERFECT). 
Further information on PERFECT is available here: http://www.proje 
ctper fect.eu/.
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As is perhaps evident from the above, the content of the 
workshop series goes beyond what analytic philosophers 
might recognise as part of a typical philosophy of mind 
course, involving discussion of topics in epistemology 
(such as the nature of belief and rationality); the philosophy 
of cognitive science (such as the comparative analysis of 
empirical findings in the mind sciences and clinical psy-
chology); and social and political philosophy, particularly 
in session five, which was focused on different models of 
mental health, with discussion of cultural concepts of illness 
and wellness, wider societal circumstances that contribute 
to mental distress, and power dynamics inherent in clinical 
interactions. Since all discussions involved some focus on 
the mind and different perceptions of thinking, we settled 
for the name “philosophy of mind” for the workshop series, 
to reduce jargon and so as not to alienate those who had not 
studied philosophy before.
Participation was not premised on any philosophical 
training, and whilst some participants were attracted to the 
workshops because they had previously studied philosophy 
in some format, for others, the groups constituted their first 
engagement with philosophy. The groups were discussion-
driven, rather than focused chiefly on reading from any 
particular philosophical canon. They were an opportunity 
to use philosophical techniques to investigate concepts and 
assumptions that are often embedded in mental health prac-
tice and broader societal discourse in a group setting.
Although those who had some previous experience of 
philosophy (through either formal study or personal read-
ing) sometimes made contributions by citing the positions of 
philosophers (for example from the analytic, continental, and 
Eastern traditions), being able to do this was not essential to 
participation. We did not observe an obvious difference in 
the level of involvement from people who had no previous 
engagement with philosophy versus those who did. We think 
that this is because our approach to debate emphasised the 
use of philosophical techniques for assessing arguments (e.g. 
those described in the summary of session one), rather than 
learning the positions of philosophers in various canons.
We set an optional final assignment, in which participants 
were invited to further explore any of the content and themes 
of the workshop series that had particularly interested them. 
About half of the participants chose to present their assign-
ment work at a final half-day meeting seven weeks after the 
sixth workshop. Some participants gave short presentations 
answering theoretical questions, drawing on the work of phi-
losophers they had researched in their own time, and linking 
this work back to the core themes of the workshops. Other 
presentations considered practical applications of ideas from 
the workshops, such as how philosophy can make a positive 
difference to self-understanding and mental health advocacy 
(In fact, this paper draws insights from one such presentation 
given by the participant author.) One participant designed a 
series of conversation cards based on the philosophical ques-
tions explored in the workshops to be used to add oppor-
tunities for reflection in clinical interactions. Another was 
inspired to work themes from the workshop series (such as 
the idea of a continuum between illness and wellness) into 
poetry.
We, the authors, clarify that this paper does not constitute 
a report on a study involving human subjects, but is a reflec-
tion on the experience of the workshop series by the facilita-
tor and a participant (and so ethical review is not applicable).
Benefits of philosophy groups in mental 
health contexts
We believe there are a number of beneficial aspects of the 
groups in which we were involved. Our claims here repre-
sent a shared perspective we have arrived at, as a participant 
and facilitator (wherever we make distinctive contributions, 
these are signposted). We acknowledge that these experi-
ences represent just two iterations of a discussion-driven 
philosophy group, and so we therefore invite researchers and 
mental health practitioners to consider further opportunities 
to investigate these potential benefits to establish whether 
they generalise. Readers may also find a podcast in which 
three of the workshop participants discuss their experiences 
and what they saw to be the benefits of the workshops.5
We think that the benefits of the groups derive chiefly 
from (i) the opportunity for structured discussion of expe-
riences; (ii) the opportunity for dialogue across different 
mental health backgrounds; (iii) the potential to reduce 
stigma and to increase self-understanding and advocacy; 
and (iv) the potential to alleviate (some) epistemic injustice. 
We think these benefits are arrived at in two sorts of ways: 
Content benefits follow from engaging with the substan-
tive philosophical content (such as contemplating different 
models of perceptual processing, or considering the role of 
irrationality in diagnostic criteria, as discussed above). Prac-
tice benefits follow from engaging in the practice of group 
philosophy, such as the dialectic exchange of ideas, and the 
critical methodology that enables participants to analyse 
claims and recognise underlying assumptions. We discuss 
(i)–(iv) in turn before making some further recommenda-
tions on the specifics of implementation.
Philosophy as a means of structuring group 
discussion of experiences and models
Philosophy aims to provide models which enrich our under-
standing of the concepts that we take for granted in everyday 
5 Further information on the podcast, and a link to listen,  can be 
found here: http://www.canst ream.co.uk/camde n/index .php?id=970
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life. This can be done through the study and critical inter-
pretation of works in the philosophical canon, and subse-
quently expanding upon or responding to these works. But, 
as outlined in the "Philosophy groups and mental health" 
section, we have a different enterprise in mind: philosophy 
as a shared, communicative practice, in which understand-
ing is facilitated by taking part in a dialectic that unfolds 
between a group of people. This sort of philosophy is, neces-
sarily, a group activity, which is both experience inclusive 
and model supported, features that we will discuss in turn.
Experience inclusive
Introspection on, and analysis of, individual experience 
plays a central role in philosophical methodology, and pro-
vides a basis for constructing philosophical models. So, 
a central aspect of doing philosophy in a group setting is 
the opportunity for lived experiences of mental health to 
be shared and reflected upon, as well as evaluated for their 
underacknowledged benefits (such as providing meaning, or 
contributing to agency). Experience is shared on a voluntary 
basis, but as it is not necessary to share one’s own experi-
ence to nevertheless participate in the group dialogue, and 
philosophical theorising, refraining from doing so is not a 
detriment to participation. One can learn from the experi-
ences of others.
Model supported
By this, we mean that the focus is not on isolated examples 
of experiences and beliefs. Instead, these are situated within 
a wider philosophical model according to the features that 
they share. This is a chance to recognise the commonali-
ties between individuals’ experiences and beliefs, as well as 
an opportunity to collectively challenge existing models in 
accordance with which these cognitions might have previ-
ously been labelled, for instance as “mad” or “irrational” 
or “pathological”. For example, what does it mean for a 
belief to be irrational, and should we think of irrationality 
as indicative of mental distress or illness? Is such a label 
helpful or harmful? Thus, the discussion can move from 
individual cases to more general questions about what char-
acteristics are necessary and sufficient for a for a label that is 
applied to those individual instances. Not only does this help 
to alleviate the pressure that can arise when concentrating on 
one individual’s experience as a focal point of discussion, it 
enables us to recharacterise our experiences according to a 
philosophical model which best accounts for their particular 
features (for instance, this could be the opportunity to situ-
ate unusual experiences within a wider model of ordinary 
human cognition).
From a participant perspective, we believe that the experi-
ence of engaging in a philosophy group, particularly one that 
meets weekly, is beneficial because it provides an ongoing 
connectedness which mitigates social and existential isola-
tion. We recognise that discussion of experiences and the 
opportunity for connection are also fostered in peer-support 
and psychoeducational groups, and so we suggest that our 
groups share many associated practice benefits with these 
groups.
We also suggest that there are particular benefits which 
derive specifically from engaging with the content of our 
philosophy groups, which are not present in the above-
mentioned groups. Whilst some psychoeducational groups 
look at theoretical questions around various diagnoses and 
experiences of distress, they are chiefly about communicat-
ing strategies to manage or treat symptoms. And whilst the 
same is true of peer-support groups, they are chiefly about 
offering mutual support. To be clear, we think that enabling 
support from peers, as well as groups which impart strate-
gies to manage distress are both important parts of mental 
health provision, and our proposal here is not to replace but 
to complement them.
Our philosophy groups have the specific aim to inves-
tigate substantive philosophical questions about mental 
health. The chief outcome is therefore not management 
or treatment, but a deepening of understanding. This is a 
content benefit that is, we argue, particular to philosophy 
groups. One gains a particular sort of understanding of the 
self after, for instance, recognising that unusual cognitions 
that are routinely labelled as pathological in mental health 
settings actually share many features with cognitions in the 
non-clinical population, and might even be indistinguishable 
on the basis of their supposed irrationality. Engaging with 
this content fosters a new understanding of the concepts, 
models, and assumptions which underlie mental health dis-
course and practice, bringing particular content benefits 
which we contend are not necessarily seen in groups that 
are already an established part of mental health provision.
One may wish to disengage from debates around ration-
ality in mental health, finding it an unhelpful way to carve 
things up, but even so, sorting cognitions into the rational 
on the one hand, and the irrational on the other, still plays a 
significant role in mental health discourse and practice, for 
instance, by figuring in diagnostic criteria. One may disa-
gree in principle with these labels, but can still use the tools 
of philosophical argument to show that even if you grant 
your interlocutor that these labels denote something real, 
still “irrational” may not demarcate something peculiar to 
the pathological that is not also found in people with no 
diagnoses or experience of ongoing mental distress.
In providing participants with philosophical tools, there 
are more general practice benefits as well. Participants can 
use these tools to interrogate the claim that irrational cogni-
tions deserve to be labelled as pathological, and to assess 
when such cognitions are harmful and when they are helpful. 
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In doing so, they develop general skills in critical think-
ing, exchange of ideas, and enquiry, which can be utilised 
beyond the philosophy group, (we discuss this in more detail 
in "Social isolation" section).
Dialogue across different mental health 
backgrounds as a means of reducing stigma
The philosophy groups we facilitated and participated in 
were open to people with different backgrounds and experi-
ences of mental health: people with lived experience, advo-
cates, and mental health professionals working in different 
contexts. Whilst we foresee situations in which it could 
be beneficial to restrict participation to just one of these 
groups (see "Implementation considerations" section) we 
think there are specific benefits in running mixed groups, as 
we did. The groups provide a setting in which people with 
quite different backgrounds can come together to collectively 
investigate the concepts and assumptions that are often taken 
for granted in mental health discourse and practice, as well 
as hearing how their own actions based on whatever model 
is assumed in their practice can affect the experiences of 
others.
Philosophy groups proceed on the notion that the group 
is neutral ground, where no particular theory has primacy, 
and as such, all theories are open to critical questioning. We 
respect that there are certain power relations that arise (for 
instance, existing between those for whom mental health is 
their profession, and those without the security and authority 
that this bestows (Femdal and Knutsen 2017). We recom-
mend that the group explicitly acknowledges and reflects on 
how these can manifest in the exchanges of those involved, 
and suggest that it is the responsibility of the facilitator to 
manage the discussion to ensure that everyone is heard (we 
describe how to do this in more detail in a facilitator guid-
ance document).6 From a participant perspective, we do 
think it is possible to feel like the discussion can be had 
among equals, and so we emphasise the importance of the 
group collectively deciding the values of the space as the 
first activity in the first meeting, encouraging humility and 
self-reflection.
We report that even in mixed groups such as ours, we 
found a considerable amount of common ground. Philoso-
phy can be done so as to encourage listening to the perspec-
tive of others, and imagining their experiences. Thought-
experiments, a key philosophical tool, for example, often 
require us to imagine the experiences of others, and what 
these experiences might imply. So, philosophy groups con-
stitute an opportunity for those with different backgrounds 
in mental health to learn from each other. Discussions that 
begin with a focus on a personal experience or practice can 
expand into an opportunity to articulate the merits and faults 
of different frameworks in mental health, and whether these 
might be changed for the better through collective action.
We can think of the benefit as coming in part from the 
information and ideas that are exchanged in this process, 
which would be a content benefit. There may be further 
benefits: existing empirical evidence on what has been 
called ‘intergroup contact theory’ suggests there may also 
be associated practice benefits that come from meetings of 
mixed groups like ours. Intergroup contact theory suggests 
that when people from dominant groups have meaningful 
engagement with those from marginalised groups, such 
as working together on a task towards a shared goal, the 
extent to which members of the dominant group stereotype 
those from marginalised groups (which can lead to stigma) 
is reduced (Alport 1955; Hewstone and Swart 2011). Vari-
ous studies demonstrate that this effect holds in the case of 
groups delineated on the basis of mental health (Corrigan 
et al. 2001; Clement et al. 2012; Thornicroft et al. 2016). 
Participants in philosophy groups need not all agree on 
which theories and models are correct, but the groups do 
prescribe an activity which enables participants to establish 
a common purpose: that of investigating, challenging, and 
re-establishing preferable philosophical models which best 
capture and validate experiences of mental health. Whilst 
we make it clear that we did not conduct an empirical study 
to establish for certain whether this effect was present in our 
groups, we suggest that the necessary conditions for mean-
ingful engagement are likely to have been met in our groups, 
for intergroup contact benefits to ensue. We gladly invite 
further empirical research on the topic.
Decreased self‑stigma, increased 
self‑understanding and advocacy
Given the pervasive stigma to which people with experi-
ences of mental distress and mental illness are exposed, we 
agree with other authors (cited in "Background" section) that 
the onus is on those in positions of power to take measures 
to avoid stigmatising language and behaviour in their inter-
actions with those experiencing mental distress. That said, 
“self-stigma”, in which people internalise and view aspects 
of their social identity through the lens of stereotypes 
embedded in dominant cultural narratives, is a real and del-
eterious phenomenon, affecting people experiencing mental 
distress (Corrigan et al. 2014). These attitudes may affect 
whether people seek help: one study shows that as attitudes 
of mental health self-stigma increase, attitudes towards treat-
ment become more negative (Sickel et al. 2019). This effect 
has also been seen in mental health professionals who are 
experiencing distress (in Knaak et al. 2017). Help-seeking 
6 The facilitator guidance document can be found here: https ://www.
birmi ngham .ac.uk/Docum ents/colle ge-artsl aw/ptr/perfe ct/philo sophy 
-of-mind/Facil itato r-Notes .pdf
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is affected by the extent to which mental health stigma is a 
cultural norm: in countries in which mental health stigma is 
more prevalent in the population, individuals are less likely 
to seek support for their mental health (Bracke et al. 2019), 
and so efforts to reduce stigma in general of course remain 
important (as we emphasise in the previous subsection).
From a participant perspective, we believe that philo-
sophical exploration facilitates self-understanding. As we 
just saw, group philosophy is an opportunity to challenge 
external descriptions of our experiences, and to recharacter-
ise them in a way that better captures their different features, 
including how they can hinder us, but also how they can 
help us (benefits deriving from engaging in the substantive 
content of the philosophy group). Relatedly, from a partici-
pant perspective, taking part in philosophical discussion can 
enable us to build confidence in expressing ourselves, help-
ing us to defend our viewpoints and better advocate for our 
position (a practice benefit). This applies to how we describe 
and communicate about our own situation. Philosophy also 
provides tools for understanding the dynamics of the mental 
health institutions and broader societal structures that we 
encounter, and for advocating for change within these struc-
tures. Participants also involved in advocacy can draw on 
learning from philosophy groups to inform their own actions 
aimed at institutional change (such as contributions to com-
mittees of medical establishments, and reviews of mental 
health legislation, etc.).
Alleviating stigma is complex, and evidence suggests 
that interventions which aim to normalise mental distress 
and the associated unusual cognitions can actually increase 
attitudes that sufferers are thereby somehow responsible for 
their condition (e.g. Gergel 2014). We think it is therefore 
important to include case studies (as we did) which give 
participants an opportunity to reflect on how mental distress 
can often be contextualised in the life experiences, political 
and economic circumstances, and social relationships of the 
individuals involved, to challenge the narrative that people 
are responsible for their own distress.
Potential to alleviate epistemic injustice
Following our arguments in the subsections “Philosophy 
as a means of structuring group discussion” and “Dialogue 
across different mental health backgrounds”, we suggest 
that doing philosophy in mixed groups could have the effect 
of (somewhat) alleviating testimonial epistemic injustice, 
because mental health professionals will be able to learn 
from people with lived experience who may offer examples 
of being on the receiving end of testimonial injustice, such 
as the experience of Richard Lakeman (2010) summarised 
in "Background" section. We must be wary of expecting 
people with lived experience of testimonial injustice to do 
the bulk of the epistemic labour by obligating them to share 
their experiences. However, if the groups are run as we sug-
gest in the facilitator guidance we produced, and the group 
is a safe and non-judgemental space, stories may well be 
shared organically. Even if the group does not have access to 
personal stories like these, mental health professionals still 
have the opportunity to critically investigate the assump-
tions underlying mental health practice through engagement 
with the substantive philosophical content (as described 
in “Philosophy as a means of structuring group discus-
sion”). Reflecting on this content, such as whether notions 
of irrationality should be decoupled from notions of pathol-
ogy, may go some way towards helping participants refrain 
from devaluing testimony from people with lived experience 
of mental distress. As Crichton et al. (2017) recommend, 
learning about the phenomenon of epistemic injustice, and 
the background conditions which produce it, is essential to 
helping to alleviate it in clinical settings.
Following on from the previous subsection, we suggest 
that philosophy groups have the potential to (somewhat) 
contribute to restoring hermeneutic epistemic justice for 
people with lived experience. This is because they provide 
the opportunity to develop a philosophical account of expe-
riences of mental distress which incorporates their deeply 
meaningful and positive features, rather than focusing only 
on negative attributes (thus drawing on the content of the 
groups). As we saw in Sect. 1, these sorts of hermeneutic 
resources for self-understanding are not always readily avail-
able from drawing on popular culture and public discourse 
about mental health. From a lived experience perspective, 
we emphasise that living with mental distress can involve 
very deep and fundamental questioning of one’s sense of 
self, and this can lead to feelings of alienation. We think 
that the practice of philosophy is effective at reaching these 
profound levels of experience, as well as providing a means 
to articulate them.
We recognise that the factors which account for epistemic 
injustice in mental health are deeply entrenched, and many 
strategies are required to restore justice (Crichton et al. 
2017; Sanati and Kyratsous 2015; Wardrope 2015; Kurs and 
Grinshpoon 2018; Miller Tate 2018). As such, we propose 
that philosophy groups constitute a modest, but potentially 
significant, strategy for change to use in conjunction with 
existing strategies.
Implementation considerations
We recognise that multiple factors may affect participants’ 
experiences of the groups, such as the content discussed, 
the manner in which they are facilitated, and the setting. We 
therefore encourage interested mental health practitioners 
and peer-support group facilitators to consider the possibility 
of philosophy groups in mental health contexts with which 
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they are familiar, and to bring their own expertise to bear on 
setting them up. Exploratory initiatives such as running an 
experimental one-off group, or giving potential participants 
the opportunity to make suggestions about what they would 
want from a philosophy group in a questionnaire could be 
informative.
Philosophy groups of the kind we envisage have an agile, 
flexible format. They can be resource-light, and adapted to 
run in a number of different settings. As mentioned above, 
in developing our own workshops, we have developed open-
access resources for facilitating such a group, which do not 
assume any previous philosophical experience, which can 
be adapted in accordance with the facilities and equipment 
available, use of a room and some chairs is sufficient. These 
resources can be accessed online.7 Whilst prior philosophi-
cal education may not be necessary, for the reasons discussed 
in “Dialogue across different mental health backgrounds”, 
we would recommend that the person leading the sessions 
has some training specifically regarding facilitating margin-
alised groups, in order to create a space in which everyone is 
comfortable and able to participate (e.g. valuing anonymity, 
mutuality and peer-support). This sort of training is often 
available through mental health charities.
The relatively agile format of philosophy groups, and the 
fact that they are not tied to the values and practices of any 
particular institution, means that they can be run in a wide 
variety of settings. This could be, for instance, in partner-
ship with a mental health advocacy group as we did; in in-
patient wards or alongside other NHS services (such as CBT 
groups); in local community centres; or even as “pop-up” 
sessions in a coffee shop or other public space (although it 
should be considered how anonymity would be managed in 
a public space).
We have discussed our experience of groups that involve 
people with different relationships to mental health, but we 
foresee situations in which one might want to run groups 
with (for example) people with lived experience only, or 
with clinicians only. This might alter the focus of the group. 
A group of mostly clinicians might want to focus on address-
ing philosophical claims embedded in clinical practice, such 
as how the notion of irrationality is used in diagnostic crite-
ria, and safeguarding against testimonial injustice in clinical 
practice. A group involving only people with lived experi-
ence might wish to focus on developing shared resources for 
advocacy and understanding.
Bonny Astor, one of the participants from our group, has 
since run a series of philosophy sessions, based on the con-
tent and methodology used in our original groups, in Pen-
tonville Prison (UK). There are distinctive challenges in the 
prison setting, including lack of participant continuity (the 
nature of prison life is such that inmates are not always at 
liberty to attend sessions consistently), meaning that it was 
harder to have a series of sessions which build on material 
discussed in the previous weeks. In this case, the facilitator 
adapted the material to the new context, keeping the core 
themes and ideas, and leaving out some of the more theory-
laden aspects. However, she reports that thought experi-
ments and the use of concrete examples worked well as a 
means of opening up the discussion and leading on to the 
more theoretical models in each individual session.
Conclusion
We saw there to be a range of benefits to running discus-
sion-driven philosophy groups for people with a range of 
backgrounds in mental health, and we have provided some 
interpretations of these benefits. We maintain that: (i) there 
is value in engaging with substantive philosophical inves-
tigation of the concepts and assumptions underlying men-
tal health discourse, particularly when this is a structured, 
communicative practice; (ii) philosophy groups present 
the opportunity for dialogue across different mental health 
backgrounds and this may go some way towards alleviat-
ing mental health stigma; (iii) that such groups can reduce 
self-stigma and increase self-understanding and advocacy; 
and (iv) they offer the potential to (somewhat) alleviate epis-
temic injustice. We urge interested mental health practition-
ers and peer-support group facilitators to consider whether a 
philosophy group in their local context could bring similar 
benefits.
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